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Abstract:  Permissibility of contraception as a method of birth control is closely connected 
with issues of moral justification of reproductive autonomy, namely the question whether 
or not individuals should be allowed to autonomously and freely decide if they are going 
to have children, when and how many. The development of medical and scientific tech-
nologies led to the usage of artificial methods of contraception that can prevent concep-
tion with the goal of postponing and planning the birth of a child. In the first part I analyse 
the bioethical arguments that appear in debates about reproductive autonomy and which 
can be mobilized against the permissibility of contraception. In the second part I have com-
pared the bioethical arguments to those used against the artificial contraception in the lit-
erature about the philosophy of sexuality. In the third and final part, I have argued against 
the stance of G.E.M. Anscombe and J. Finnis that there is morally relevant distinction be-
tween artificial and natural methods of birth control. 
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1. Introduction
The development of medical and scientific technologies led to the usage of arti-
ficial methods of contraception (barrier methods, hormone and chemical meth-
ods, intrauterine devices, surgical methods) that can prevent conception with the 
goal of postponing and planning the birth of a child. Individual autonomy in de-
ciding whether to have children, how many and when becomes far greater than in 
the time when birth control was reduced to abstinence and the rhythm method 
of fertile and infertile days. As a result, the debate about the moral status of con-
traception is opened in a way that some participants qualified the use of artificial 
methods as morally unacceptable. 
The dubious moral status of contraception and birth control was primarily de-
rived from the broader procreative theory of human sexuality. More precisely, the 
moral prohibition of contraception was directly associated with the stance of the 
Catholic Church as an institution that supports a more restrictive view of sexual 
ethics and especially reproductive autonomy. However, the views on contracep-
tion that were set out in the Encyclical Letter Humanae Vitae of Pope Paul VI CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN BIOETHICS: THE NATIONAL AND REGIONAL CONTEXT
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and that were defended by reputable Catholic philosophers such as John Finn-
is and G.E.M. Anscombe are the main target of our questioning. (Pope Paul VI 
1968, Finnis 1970, Anscombe 1975, 1981). It should be noted that this Encyclical 
Letter provoked great attention of theorists and the public because the tradition-
ally more restrictive doctrinal stance on birth control and contraception was lib-
eralized. Namely, even though the general view on procreative autonomy was 
specified in the words: “each and every single married couple must be open to-
wards creating life”, the so-called natural methods of birth control or the methods 
known as the rhythm method (of fertile and infertile days) were allowed. At the 
same time, all artificial methods of contraception were labelled as morally wrong: 
every action specifically intended to prevent procreation is forbidden, including 
both chemical and barrier methods of contraception because all these were held 
to directly contradict the natural and moral order which was established by God. I 
have argued in this paper against the arguments of G.E.M. Anscombe and J. Finnis 
that artificial contraception is morally more questionable than the natural meth-
ods of birth control.The main issue of the paper is the analysis of what is wrong 
with the artificial birth control methods or specifically, what is the morally rele-
vant difference between natural and artificial birth control methods that can jus-
tify the different treatment of these methods.
It has to be noticed that the moral status of contraception is closely connected 
with the issues that appear in bioethics debates about the moral status of abor-
tion, medically assisted conception or in vitro fertilisation, surrogate motherhood 
and similar topics. However, comparatively with the mentioned issues regarding 
procreative autonomy, questioning contraception was rarely stressed as relevant 
topic in bioethical debates. On the other side, the moral status of contraception 
received deserved attention in the seventies and early eighties of the last century 
in the debates about human sexuality. Consequently, we will investigate the moral 
status of contraception firstly in bioethical debates and then in the debates about 
the philosophy of sexuality (in the framework of which Finnis and Anscombe of-
fer their proposals). 
2. The status of contraception in bioethics debates
Contraception can be defined as a procedure/method of preventing conception 
with the goal of planning the birth of a child or simply as a method of pregnancy 
control. Some authors, such as, for instance, G.E.M. Anscombe, suggest that only 
artificial methods can be named as contraception refusing to apply the same label 
to natural methods. However, we will use the notion in a broader sense in which 
natural methods as well as artificial methods should be treated as contraception 
because all of them aim to prevent conception.1
1   When debating artificial methods, I will not refer to post-coital protection, the use of 
emergency pills and methods such as sterilization. Although sterilization of men and women THE MORAL STATUS OF CONTRACEPTION AND OPENNESS TO PROCREATION  SNjEžANA PRIjIć – SAMARžIjA
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On the other side, the absence of the problem of contraception as the focus of bio-
ethics debates can seem quite odd. Debates about reproductive autonomy need 
to embrace contraception as well as other issues such as abortion, assisted repro-
duction, surrogate motherhood, prenatal diagnostics, experimentation on em-
bryos, ectogenesis and similar topics. Or, as Devine explains, contraception as 
well as abortion and infanticide are all measures that enable human beings to 
enjoy the form of sexual experience most of them prefer while at the same time 
avoiding or negating its reproductive consequences. (Devin 1983). On the other 
side, it is comprehensible because the arguments about the moral permissibility 
of abortion, medically assisted conception or especially infanticide are based on 
the question whether or not murder is admissible, which makes the issue of con-
traception less morally severe. For instance, a majority of pro-life philosophers 
define abortion as homicide because the life of a person with all her rights, in-
cluding the right to live, allegedly starts at the moment of conception. However, 
the same philosophers hold that contraception cannot be treated as a homicide. 
Nevertheless, contraception as well as abortion or in vitro fertilization imposes 
the dilemmas concerning the intrinsic value of life or the value of ‘humanity as an 
inviolable end’. (Masek 2008). “(…) we believe (…) that a premature death is bad in 
itself, even when it is not bad for any particular person. Many people believe this 
about suicide and euthanasia—that a terrible thing has happened when someone 
takes his own life or when his doctor kills him at his own request even when death 
may be in that person’s own best interests. We believe the same about abortion: 
that it is sometimes wrong not because it violates a fetus’s right or harms its in-
terests, but in spite of a fetus’s having no rights or interests to violate. (…) the life 
of a human organism has intrinsic value in any form it takes (…). (Dworkin 2001: 
158). Contraception truly prevents the creation of life or decreases the number of 
people that would exist if contraception was not used. There are several argumen-
tation lines that appeal more or less directly to the potentiality: it is wrong to pre-
vent the existence of any potential person who would naturally become a rational 
and conscious person which would be able to think and feel pain or it is a serious 
mistake to intervene in a process that has some degree of potentiality in terms of 
the creation of a new person. 
can also be classified as an artificial contraception method, in this article I will leave the spe-
cific debate about the permanent status and irreversibility of this method out of our focus. 
Also, I’ll leave post-coital contraception aside because this type of contraception is distinct in 
nature and, according to many philosophers the moral status of these pills includes the dis-
cussion of abortion (the aim of this device is to prevent further pre-natal development if con-
ception has already occurred). Also, the inclusion of this procedure in the discussion would 
require additional moral debates, such as, for example, whether doctors and specialists may 
refuse to give the pill because they for reasons of conscience refuse to assist in performing 
abortions and similar issues, which are not relevant for the majority of other artificial devices. 
(See in Card 2007). CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN BIOETHICS: THE NATIONAL AND REGIONAL CONTEXT
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However, it seems that the majority of participants in the discussion about po-
tentiality deny the possibility of applying this argument to the case of contracep-
tion. For instance, Laura Purdy stresses the non-identity problem claiming that 
there seems to be no reason to believe that possible individuals are either de-
prived or injured if they do not exist. If we had not been created, we would not 
exist and there would be nobody to be deprived of anything.(Purdy 1996). Don 
Marquis holds that his ‘deprivation argument’ cannot be applied here because the 
wrongfulness of contraception cannot be deduced from the argument of damag-
ing the future person-like-us, simply because there is not a subject that we can 
non-arbitrarily identify as one of those who suffer any harm. Nothing at all is de-
nied such a future by contraception, he writes. (Marquis 1989: 201). Further, John 
Noonan noticed that the probability that the sperm and egg will, after sexual in-
tercourse, develop into new life is not sufficiently high to talk about a potential 
person and her potential rights. Contraception needs to be permissible because 
of the small likelihood that spermatozoa will develop into thinking and feeling 
moral agents2(Noonan 1970). It seems that the majority of pro-life philosophers 
think that contraception does not violate any person’s rights nor in any clear and 
proximate way injure common purposes of civil society (Grisez 1965). Besides, to 
this potentiality argument a certain slippery slope objection can be set out: if not 
being brought into existence was an injury and we were committed to a principle 
of minimizing harm, this would imply the absurd conclusion that failing to repro-
duce at a maximal rate is a moral wrong (Card 2007).
We can resume that from the bioethical perspective, it seems that there is no 
proper reason to prohibit contraception: it does not violate the intrinsic value 
of life, nor the humanity as an inviolable end. However, more important here is 
the conclusion that no matter how we summarize the bioethical debate about 
the moral status of contraception, it is essential to notice that that the partici-
pants in the discussions do not perceive any morally relevant difference between 
artificial and natural methods of contraception. If, for the sake of birth control, 
2   J. Noonan argues that in each ejaculation there are 200 million sperm cells from which only 
one has a chance to develop into a zygote; and from 100 000 oocytes only 390 ovulate. On the 
other hand, even if we take into account that there is a 20% chance of miscarriage, in about 
four of five cases a new being will have a chance to develop before conception. However, ac-
cording to him, after conception, a sharp change in probability happens, which also signifies 
a huge jump in potentialities. (See in Prijić – Samaržija 2007). It should be noticed that some 
philosophers criticize Noonan’s and Marquis’s position according to which the prohibition 
of contraception does not follow from the prohibition of abortion. However, their conclusion 
is not directed against the moral permissibility of contraception but, rather, that abortion 
need to be abolished. (Norcross 1990). I do not want here to enter into the discussion whether 
antiabortionists are right when they approve contraception while arguing against abortion. 
I only want to register that even antiabortionists do not think that the arguments they use 
against abortion could be applicable to contraception.THE MORAL STATUS OF CONTRACEPTION AND OPENNESS TO PROCREATION  SNjEžANA PRIjIć – SAMARžIjA
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sexual   relations are practiced only during the infertile days when it is impossible 
to conceive, the creation of a new person is prevented in the same way as in the 
case of usage of artificial contraception during the fertile days. In other words, the 
stances presented in the Encyclical LetterHumanae Vitae—according to which 
the rhythm method is admissible while artificial contraception is not—cannot be 
supported with the arguments that are offered in bioethical debates.
3. The procreative theory of sexuality and contraception
Surprisingly or not, more systematic argumentation about the moral status of 
contraception can be derived from the field that deals with the issue about the na-
ture of human sexuality. The Christian doctrine has, from its very beginning, con-
nected human sexuality with the fallen human nature that cannot control its sex-
ual urges and lust and, consequently, recognizes sexuality as wrong and shameful 
(St. Augustine 1966). However, it is clearly realised that sexual relations are the 
only way of conception and procreation. The resulting stance of the procreative 
theory about human sexuality was that sexual intercourses are legitimate and 
morally permissible only if they lead to conception, or, in other words, if they ful-
fil their procreative potential. Pre-reformed Christianity, consequently, assumed 
that contraception converts natural sexual intercourse between spouses into non-
natural; it is not aimed at procreation, which means that it is a deviant and mor-
ally unacceptable act. They rely on the Aristotelian terminology and theory, argu-
ing that the natural function of the sexual organs is conception and procreation, 
that is, that procreation or childbirth is a natural function of human sexuality (St. 
Thomas Aquinas 1975). In other words, the authority of the wise creator of nature 
determines procreation as the ultimate purpose of sexual relations. Consequently, 
it is an articulated moral imperative according to which sexual intercourse is legit-
imate and moral only if there is a possibility to conceive. Procreation, we need to 
be more precise, is not just about conception and the birth of a child, but also in-
cludes raising children and the community of men and women in the indissoluble 
marriage, which is conceived as an optimal framework for this task. So, the fun-
damental attitude of Aquinas’ sexual ethics is that morally permissible are only 
the sexual relations between spouses in which it is possible to conceive. Marital 
sexual relations in which it is not possible to conceive are contrary to the natural 
law and the creator. Pleasure itself should not be the aim of sexual relations and 
the aim of procreation should not be sacrificed to pleasure (St Augustine 1966, St. 
Thomas Aquinas 1975). Contraception, i.e. any method that prevents conception 
converts the natural intercourse between spouses into an unnatural, deviant and 
morally unacceptable act.
It  should  be  noticed  that  Humanae Vitae presents  a  remarkable  declination 
from this traditional procreative theory because sexuality is understood here as 
a necessary part of martial closeness, love and care. It is true that, according to CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN BIOETHICS: THE NATIONAL AND REGIONAL CONTEXT
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  Humanae Vitae, every action specifically intended to prevent procreation is for-
bidden: “Similarly excluded is any action which either before, at the moment of, or 
after sexual intercourse, is specifically intended to prevent procreation—whether 
as an end or as a means” (Pope Paul VI 1968: §14). However, the rhythm method, 
in which there is no active interference in the sexual intercourse, is allowed as a 
birth control method: (…) the Church teaches that married people may then take 
advantage of the natural cycles immanent in the reproductive system and engage 
in marital intercourse only during those times that are infertile, thus controlling 
birth in a way which does not in the least offend the moral principles (…)” (Pope 
Paul VI 1968: §16). Pope Paul VI concludes: “Consequently, unless we are willing 
that the responsibility of procreating life should be left to the arbitrary decision 
of men, we must accept that there are certain limits, beyond which it is wrong to 
go, to the power of man over his own body and its natural functions—limits, let it 
be said, which no one, whether as a private individual or as a public authority, can 
lawfully exceed” (Pope Paul VI 1968: §17).
John Finnis is the representative of the so-called new theory of natural law (Finn-
is, 1970). Although John Finnis does not directly consider the issue of contracep-
tion, but the general question of unnatural and morally defective sexual inter-
courses, it is clear that he holds that artificial contraception can be considered as 
an active interference while the rhythm method only makes sexual partners tem-
porary sterile. Finnis emphasizes that procreation and raising children is a basic 
human good such as, for example, life and knowledge. The basic human goods 
are not morally good in itself, which would mean that they are not a moral obli-
gation for all but they must be chosen when we are faced with a choice between 
some of these goods and other personal aims. For instance, according to Finnis, 
procreation and raising children is not an obligation for all, but in sexual relations 
between spouses, they always have to choose the sex in which it is possible for a 
woman to become pregnant. Finnis raises the question of what actions, according 
to their causal structure, include a choice that is appropriately open to the fun-
damental values, and what actions, according to their causal structure, assume 
a choice against the fundamental values. He, himself, concludes that the choice 
that excludes the possibility of procreation in a sexual relationship is clearly and 
unambiguously (there is no requirement for further arguing about Christian val-
ues) directly opposite to the basic good (Finnis 1970). From this Finnis’ attitude it 
could be concluded that the use of any method of contraception is not an option 
because sexual behaviours should always be open to conception.3
3    Similarly,  sexual  intercourse  between  homosexual  partners  or  masturbation  should 
be classified as acts that are not open to the fundamental good of procreation. J. Finnis is 
actually much more focused on moral status of these forms of sexual behaviour than to 
  contraception.THE MORAL STATUS OF CONTRACEPTION AND OPENNESS TO PROCREATION  SNjEžANA PRIjIć – SAMARžIjA
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However, he differentiates the moral statuses of the choices in which someone 
  actively takes steps to prevent procreation from those when they are not   taken, 
but the circumstances are such that it is impossible to conceive. The rhythm 
method (in spite of the fact that the ‘full’ sexual relation is not fulfilled) respects 
the value of procreation, because sexual intercourse is appropriately open to the 
basic good. For example, sexual relation between naturally sterile spouses cannot 
end in procreation, but it is not considered as a choice against the fundamental 
goods: it is appropriately open to the value of procreation. It follows undoubtedly 
that artificial contraception can be considered as active intervention in sexual in-
tercourse while sexual intercourse during infertile days can be treated as sexual 
intercourse of temporary sterile partners (infertile days can be regarded as a kind 
of natural temporary sterility). Indifference toward procreation in cases of natu-
ral contraception is not a serious problem as long as their sexual intercourse is 
natural in the sense of the lack of any active intervention into sexual intercourse. 
Such a position is much more elaborated in the articles of G.E.M. Anscombe, in 
which she explicitly argues in favour of the moral admissibility of the rhythm 
methods and against artificial methods (Anscombe 1975, 1981). She claims that, 
even if behind both artificial and natural methods there is the same desire and 
intention to avoid conception and pregnancy, except only artificial methods need 
to be forbidden. Similarly to Finnis, she claims that active intervention in sexu-
al intercourse makes a morally relevant difference between the allowable act and 
the improper act. When a couple uses contraceptives, the intention of avoiding 
conception is an integral part of the sexual act. At the same time, the same in-
tention is only furthered in the case of relying on natural methods. Sexual inter-
course in the infertile days is identical to sexual intercourse when it is possible to 
conceive. The first differs from second only in the time frame of the cycle of fer-
tile and infertile days. Although sexual intercourse during the infertile days is de 
facto a non-generative act in which it is not possible to conceive, such an act is in-
trinsically generative because there is no difference between such an act and an 
act in which it is possible to conceive. On the other hand, the use of artificial con-
traception transforms a natural sexual act into a perversion of the natural order 
because it changes the nature of the sexual act in a physical sense: the act that is 
naturally open to conception becomes non-procreative due to human interven-
tion (  Anscombe 1975).
What can be derived from Anscombe’s words is that a responsible attitude toward 
sexuality for an ‘honest and responsible’ person always involves openness to pro-
creation of children, where ‘openness’ can be interpreted in two ways: (i) the sex-
ual act is open to procreation if there is a spirit open to procreation (ii) the sexual 
act as a physical act is open to procreation if it is intrinsically generative. Natural 
birth control, according to Anscombe, satisfies both conditions of moral conduct.CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN BIOETHICS: THE NATIONAL AND REGIONAL CONTEXT
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4. Natural, artificial and (im)moral
In what follows, I will try to propose some critical remarks on the arguments 
  Anscombe and Finnis offered. 
4.1. Openness to procreation
Anscombe claims that a sexual act is open to procreation if there is a spirit that 
is open to procreation. It is pretty mysterious what is ‘a spirit open to procre-
ation’. However, no matter how we interpret her words, it seems that any con-
scious and intentional prevention of conception (natural or artificial) equally dis-
regards the spirit of openness to procreation. Anscombe does not consider that 
a couple should have as many children as they possibly could and she holds that 
abortion is far more wrong than contraception. So, the mere intention of avoid-
ing conception is not opposed to the spirit of procreation. She writes that it is un-
deniable that married couples, for acceptable reasons, are perfectly clear in their 
intention to avoid children (Anscombe 1975). Moreover, she refers to the words of 
Pope Paul VI that it cannot be denied that a marital couple is perfectly justified 
in their intention to control conception and the birth of a child: “It cannot be de-
nied that in each case the married couple, for acceptable reasons, are both per-
fectly clear in their intention to avoid children and wish to make sure that none 
will result”(Pope Paul VI 1968: §16).
If the intention to avoid conception is morally legitimate, it does not matter 
whether it is integral to the act, or only further. So, from the perspective of the 
spirit open to procreation—artificial contraception is open to procreation just as 
much as natural birth control: any prevention of conception disregards the open-
ness to procreation and, consequently, natural birth control contravenes to the 
spirit open to procreation in the same way artificial contraception does. Secondly, 
if the intention of avoiding pregnancy is not morally doubtable in itself then the 
intention behind the usage of artificial methods is morally acceptable as well as 
the intention behind the rhythm method. It seems that: (i) the intention of avoid-
ing pregnancy is present as the integral intention both in cases of natural and ar-
tificial methods, but (ii) if this intention of avoiding pregnancy is not generally 
wrong, it does not matter whether it is integral or not to the act.
—
Although, Anscome also writes that the sexual act as a physical act is open to pro-
creation if it is intrinsically generative. A sexual act in which the couple uses arti-
ficial method is not intrinsically generative and a certain difference in intentions 
can be noticed: there is a difference in the intention to intervene into the sexual in-
tercourse by using artificial devices that can prevent pregnancy and the   intention THE MORAL STATUS OF CONTRACEPTION AND OPENNESS TO PROCREATION  SNjEžANA PRIjIć – SAMARžIjA
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to use the rhythm method to prevent pregnancy. Therefore, the only relevant dif-
ference between these two legitimate intentions to avoid conception and preg-
nancy is the intention to use an artificial device. Moreover, she writes that a sexual 
intercourse is defective and shameful if, before, during or after the act the couple 
does something that assumes the prevention of conception (Anscombe 1981). We 
realize now that ‘does something’ refers to the use of artificial devices. 
4.2. Natural and artificial 
What is wrong with the use of artificial devices? Anscombe explicitly states that 
she is not against the use of artificial means in general and that the mere use of 
artificial means is not contrary to natural law. There are permissible interferenc-
es in the natural order of things, but the use of artificial contraceptives is not; it 
opposes to the natural law, which is understood as the moral law in a similar way 
in which conception without sexual intercourse opposes to the natural law (Ans-
combe 1981). So, we can ask her a question: how can an act that is essentially cor-
rect (the use of artificial devices in general) become wrong because a part of its 
character involves an intention (to avoid conception) that is also correct (Teich-
man 2003)?
If someone wants to claim that sexual intercorse with artificial devices is mor-
ally distinctive from a sexual intercourse without them, it is necessary to provide 
further explanation why the usage of artificial devices in this specific case is not 
morally appropriate. Namely, it implies that only the sexual intercourse without 
artificial contraception could be treated as natural behaviour, while the other one 
is not natural and hence it is defective and shameful. Firstly, it is crucial to define 
what ‘natural behaviour’ is and why such behaviour excludes intercourse with ar-
tificial devices. Secondly, it is necessary to explain why natural behaviour (in a 
‘physical sense’) is exclusively moral or, even if we accept that only the sexual in-
tercourse without artificial devices is (physically) natural, why is such natural be-
haviour exclusively moral. 
Some philosophers argue that there is no sense in talking about the natural and 
the unnatural in sexual relations because there is no sexual behaviour that is not 
natural (Slote 1975). Contrary to such a stance based on the authority of nature, 
Catholic philosophers ground their stance on the authority of the creator. How-
ever, it is worth noting that it is possible to separate the view, which claims that 
procreation is the primary function of a sexual relationship from the religious or 
theistic assumptions: for instance, from the perspective of evolutionary theory of 
human sexuality, a sexual relationship in which it is not possible to conceive due 
to artificial devices is unnatural and deviant. However, the qualifications need to 
be understood exclusively in a biological sense. Such behaviour opposes to the 
natural purpose or function of sexual intercourse, but it does not mean that such CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN BIOETHICS: THE NATIONAL AND REGIONAL CONTEXT
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behaviour is morally defective. In other words, even if we accept that the use ar-
tificial contraception is not natural in a biological sense, this claim cannot be 
extended,without any further explanation, into a position that the use of artifi-
cial contraception is immoral (Ruddick 1984). It is seriously misleading to iden-
tify the biological (physical) structure of sexual act with the moral structure of a 
sexual act.
Secondly, if we identify ‘natural behaviour’ with behaviour that is in accordance 
with the natural law conceived as an ethical cogito, there is also no reason to 
classify sexual intercourse with artificial contraception as unnatural behaviour. 
Namely, there are two basic kinds of arguments which might be offered in defence 
of the position that artificial contraception should be classified as unnatural be-
haviour (as opposed to natural law): the analytical argument and the empirical 
argument. There is no analytical (conceptual) relationship between a sexual in-
tercourse with artificial contraception and the idea of the natural law, which is 
understood as an ethical imperative about the full realization of human nature. 
The biological (physical) structure of any act cannot determine the moral status 
of the act, and no reason is offered to think that a sexual act is an exception. Also, 
there is no empirical evidence in favour of correlation between artificial contra-
ception and the alleged ‘evil effects’ against nature or the natural law such as, for 
instance, the high divorce rate, infidelity, hostility towards children, the lack of 
self–control, selfishness, sterility, race extinction, or even adultery or abortion. 
The same reasons that are used to justify the rhythm method as consistent with 
the natural law—medical, eugenic, economic, and social4—may also justify arti-
ficial contraception. The principles of natural law, in certain circumstances, may 
even demand the usage of artificial birth control as well as they demand rhythm 
(Beis 1965). Contrary to the objection that sexual relations with artificial contra-
ception are a manifestation of morally suspicious, self-centred and egoistic eth-
ics, altruistic ethics could require the use of contraception in the circumstances of 
overpopulation (Cooper 1931). 
We can now conclude that nothing concerning artificial contraception can pos-
sibly make a sexual act unnatural in any morally relevant sense: if there isn’t any-
thing wrong in the intention not to conceive during sexual intercourse, if there 
isn’t anything wrong with artificial devices and if intercourse with artificial devic-
es is not unnatural in a morally relevant sense—the only question left to consid-
er is whether active intervention with artificial devices is a this morally relevant 
distinction. 
4   “If therefore there are well-grounded reasons for spacing births, arising from the physical 
or psychological condition of husband or wife, or from external circumstances (…)”. (Pope 
Paul VI 1968: §16).THE MORAL STATUS OF CONTRACEPTION AND OPENNESS TO PROCREATION  SNjEžANA PRIjIć – SAMARžIjA
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4.3. Active intervention 
Finally, it could be said that active intervention with the use of artificial contra-
ceptives into a sexual intercourse with the aim to prevent conception is morally 
defective behaviour (while the rhythm method is not because there is no active 
intervention with any devices). Active interference in the procreative process is 
impermissible while passively letting things happen in the procreative process is, 
on the other hand, permissible. Such a stance can be comparable with the anti-
abortionist stance that abortion is wrong because it is an active interference that 
kills a person (a fetus) while letting a person (a woman) die due to pregnancy is 
not. Also, in a debate about euthanasia, active killing is morally far more severe 
than passive not-saving someone’s life.
It needs to be realized that there is no analogy between these debates about abor-
tion and euthanasia on the one side and the debate about contraception on the 
other: as we could previously see, contraception is not a question of killing/letting 
die, since there is not a person or a human being here. Some other debates about 
the moral distinction between killing and letting die stress the questions about 
responsibility and intention. However, as we tried to show above, none of the ar-
guments succeeded in showing the distinction in intentions that could imply a 
distinction in responsibilities.5
Finally, the rhythm method cannot be classified as passively letting things happen 
because a couple actively counts the fertile and the infertile days (using a calen-
dar or measuring the basal temperature). A couple intentionally and actively takes 
part in sexual intercourse during the infertile days in which they are temporary 
infertile just because they are infertile: it is not the case that sexual intercourse 
happens to them during a period in which they are temporary infertile. So, both 
natural and artificial contraception are certain prevention strategies. The differ-
ence between the artificial and natural birth control methods can eventually be in 
the difference between the ‘passive’ and ‘active’ prevention strategies to avoid risk. 
However, no prevention strategy can be considered passive behaviour. In other 
words, active interference as a trait of solely artificial contraception cannot be a 
morally relevant distinction.
5. Pleasure and contraception: a possible interpretation
Finally, I will try to propose a possible hidden assumption in this reformed Catho-
lic stance about what is the morally relevant distinction between the sexual inter-
courses in which a couple uses natural and the sexual intercourses in which the 
couple uses artificial methods of birth control. Also, I will try to show that, even 
under such an assumption, there is not a morally relevant difference. 
5   H. Kuhse and P. Singer show generally that there is no morally significant distintion be-
tween killing and letting die. (Kuhse and Singer 1985). CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN BIOETHICS: THE NATIONAL AND REGIONAL CONTEXT
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If artificial contraception was morally permissible it would imply that all sexual 
intercourse conducted solely by the desire for pleasure is right. According to the 
procreative theory of sexuality, however, pleasure in itself may not be the goal of 
sexual intercourse: while Humanae Vitae legitimises pleasure in marital sexual re-
lations in a sense that it is not condemned, pleasure still may not be the purpose 
of sexual relations. Since the acceptance of artificial methods of birth control can 
result in sexual intercourse purely motivated by pleasure, it would result in ‘the 
general lowering of moral standards’. “Not much experience is needed to be fully 
aware of human weakness and to understand that human beings—and especially 
the young, who are so exposed to temptation—need incentives to keep the moral 
law, and it is an evil thing to make it easy for them to break that law. Another ef-
fect that gives cause for alarm is that a man who grows accustomed to the use of 
contraceptive methods may forget the reverence due to a woman, and, disregard-
ing her physical and emotional equilibrium, reduce her to being a mere instru-
ment for the satisfaction of his own desires, no longer considering her as his part-
ner whom he should surround with care and affection” (Pope Paul VI 1968: §17).
Such an interpretation could be supported by Anscombe’s stance that the use of 
artificial contraceptives by a married couple is worse than adultery and that it 
is contrary to the idea of     marriage itself (Anscombe 1975). A marriage in which 
there is an intention to enjoy sexual relations while also avoiding the full inten-
tion of conception is incorrect. Therefore, the approval of artificial contraception 
legitimises and allows invalid marriages that are based purely on pleasure. Conse-
quently, the most coherent assumption behind Anscombe’s stance about artificial 
contraception is that sexual intercourse motivated by pleasure, and not procre-
ation, brings into question the spirit of openness to procreation.
From this perspective, we can now interpret the previously elaborated distinction 
between natural and unnatural sexual relations. For example, Donald Levy de-
fined ‘unnatural’ in terms of the basic human goods: the basic human goods are 
those which are necessary and those anyone wants regardless of circumstances, 
such as life, health, control of physical and mental functions, the ability to acquire 
knowledge, love and the capacity to love (Levy 1980). The basic human goods are 
those that define humanity in a way that the lack of such goods can be identified 
with inhumanity. It is unnatural for human beings to reject their own or others’ 
basic human goods (except in some extreme cases in which the basic goods them-
selves are in conflict). Pleasure is not a fundamental human good. When some-
one sacrifices their own or other people’s fundamental human goods to pleasure, 
it can be said that it is an unnatural or deviant act. 
So, we can now offer a possible (religious) answer to our questions about what is 
wrong with artificial birth control or what is the morally relevant difference be-
tween the natural and the artificial birth control methods than can justify the THE MORAL STATUS OF CONTRACEPTION AND OPENNESS TO PROCREATION  SNjEžANA PRIjIć – SAMARžIjA
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  different treatment of these methods: (i) it is wrong that pleasure is the purpose 
of sexual relations; (ii) artificial methods of birth control can result in sexual re-
lationships motivated purely by pleasure; (iii) therefore, artificial contraceptives 
are not acceptable. I have no intention to claim here that this interpretation is cor-
rect; such a hypothesis definitely requires further investigation. However, I would 
like to stress that even under this interpretation there is no valid reason not to al-
low artificial contraception if a natural method has already been approved.
Firstly, we agree here with Igor Primoratz, who claims that pleasure is not morally 
valuable in itself, but it is also not immoral in itself either. Pleasure can be good 
in a sense that is not amoral, so pleasure does not have to seek moral legitima-
cy. Pleasure is not subject to moral judgment (unless it involves violence or other 
forms of coercion and manipulation, in which case it can, naturally, be immoral) 
(Primoratz 1999). Additionally, most people do not use artificial contraception in 
order to fully avoid procreation but as a method of family planning that is more 
reliable than the rhythm method. Sexual relationships with artificial contracep-
tion are motivated by the seeking of pleasure just like the sexual relationships in 
which the couple relies on natural methods. Moreover, it is possible to imagine 
that couples that ‘sacrifice procreative potential to pleasure’ rely completely on 
natural birth control methods. So, there is nothing essential in natural contra-
ception that prevents ‘invalid marriages based purely on pleasure’. Also, there is 
nothing in artificial contraception that implies that sexual relations with artifi-
cial contraceptives necessary signify the indifference to the (alleged) fundamen-
tal good of procreation. 
Primljeno: 15. decembar 2012.
Prihvaćeno: 4. januar 2013.
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Snježana Prijić – Samaržija
Moralnost uporabe kontracepcije i otvorenost prokreaciji 
Apstrakt
Moralna prihvatljivost kontracepcije kao metode kontrole rađanja usko je povezana s 
pitanjem moralnog opravdanja reproduktivne autonomije, odnosno s pitanjem treba 
li pojedincima dopustiti da autonomno i slobodno odlučuju o tome hoće li imati dje-
ce, kada i koliko. Razvoj medicinskih i znanstvenih tehnologija doveo je do upotrebe 
umjetnih metoda kontracepcije koji sprječavaju začeće s ciljem odgađanja i planiranja 
rađanja djece. U prvom dijelu članka analiziram bioetičke argumente koji se iznose u 
raspravi o reproduktivnoj autonomiji, a koji bi mogli biti mobilizirani protiv dopuštanja 
upotrebe umjetne kontracepcije. U drugom dijelu, uspoređujem bioetičke argumen-
te s daleko razrađenijim argumentima protiv umjetne kontracepcijekoji se pojavljuju u 
raspravama u filozofiji seksualnosti. U trećem i posljednjem dijelu, iznosim argumente 
protiv stavova G.E.M. Anscombe i J. Finnisa koji opravdavaju upotrebu prirodne metode 
kontrole rađanja, ali ne i umjetnih sredstva na način da ukazujem da nema moralno re-
levantne razlike između ove dvije metode kontrole začeća i rađanja. 
Ključne riječi  kontracepcija, bioetika, filozofija seksualnosti, reproduktivna autonomija, 
prirodne I umjetne metode.